JOHNSON – Ukraine has options available, as peace treaty imminent

VERY HIGH LEVEL and deep conversations are happening behind the scenes regarding next steps in Ukraine.  The primary idea is to ‘freeze’ the war at the present battle lines, with Russia keeping captured territories in the east, and Ukraine giving up the section of Kursk Oblast it absorbed in an offensive this summer.

This is the rhetoric seen in American media recently, as well as from some NATO leaders and diplomats.  The idea being for Ukraine and Zelenski to just let go and accept the loss in the name of peace.

This is not the only side to the argument.  Some argue that Ukraine cannot simply freeze the war and call it peace:

– Without a defense clause and troops on the ground from other countries. Ukraine will need a massive standing army to guard a frontline spanning over a thousand kilometers.

– As there is no deterrence against a future Russian invasion, once Putin rearms and fills his army with trained recruits, the uncertainty will drive more Ukrainian people to leave the country, as a repeat attack would be pretty much guaranteed.

– A political crisis will spark if Zelensky is forced into a bad peace deal, once a post-war election happens in democratic Ukraine, creating a nation in political turmoil.

– A Ukraine under constant future Russian invasion threat won’t attract international trade investments nor will it economically recover as Ukraine finds it only has access to international high-interest loans.

– And an impoverished, crisis-ridden Ukraine will be no match for a partially recovering Russia, which can leverage eased sanctions and resource exports to Europe.

– Considering military and financial aid at current levels won’t continue indefinitely for Ukraine, and Russia’s potential to recover is far stronger, t his is a recipe for a second Putin invasion.

In short, any deal that doesn’t deter Russia from a second invasion, is a death sentence for Ukraine.

For all his bluster and media manipulation around the world with his nuclear threats, Putin knows that Russia would lose a conventional war with NATO.  There is a reason Moscow hasn’t tried to do to the Baltic states what it’s doing to Ukraine.  The trouble is that most NATO states aren’t keen on war with Russia, and in a system that gives each capital a veto on admitting new members, it becomes hard to see how Kyiv could ever join.

Hungary’s Victor Orbin for one has been pretty open that he would block such a move, and Slovakia Prime Minister Robert Fico has said that he would never agree to Ukraine in NATO.

Just this past October, Politico reported that Germany, the U.S., Slovenia, Spain and Belgium have all expressed doubts as well. In most cases the fear is that accepting Ukraine into NATO could lead to immediate conflict, as the infamous Article 5 of NATO agreement would require it. We need to remember that it is entrenched in the NATO accord that a country at war can not enter NATO … period.

All of this means simple entry into NATO proper, though the front door, isn’t really in the cards for Ukraine, but that doesn’t mean there aren’t other creative approaches towards the same ends of supporting Ukraine from future Russian invasion.

Let’s look at options being discussed around the world.

– Some have suggested adopting the Cold War era West Germany model which saw only the Democratic half of the country being placed under the NATO umbrella. One leader who has been pushing this model is Czech president Peta Pavel suggesting that full restoration of control over the entire territory is not a prerequisite.

“If there is a demarcation even an administrative border, then we can treat that as a temporary border and accept Ukraine into NATO, in the territory it will control at that time.”

That means that Russia would effectively be declaring war on NATO if it moved 1 inch west of the ceasefire line in the future. On the other hand, it would mean the alliance has no duty to step in over events in Crimea or the Russian conquered area of Donbass.

In this scenario, Ukraine could define a militarily defensible border, agree to not permanently station troops or nuclear weapons on its territory unless threatened with attack, and renounce use of force beyond that border except in self-defence.

That could make Ukraine’s NATO membership easier to accept, both for Russia which would de facto gain land, ensure NATO nukes aren’t parked within minutes of Moscow and would stand as a way out for western allies that don’t really want to fight a major war.

But there is also the big question of whether the U.S., let alone its European allies, would be prepared to make the force commitments necessary to defend a Ukraine inside the alliance.

A Trump White House seems unlikely to want to support Ukraine over Russia at all.  They seem more interested in using Russia as a pawn against Chinese trade and military barriers.

– Another proposal imagines a sort of ‘NATO lite’ where Kyiv doesn’t actually join NATO, but the alliances members provide so much support, that the Kremlin would know that any renewed attack on Ukraine would quickly escalate into a NATO war.

It is plausible that if Europe considers putting troops into Ukraine in exchange for U.S. reaffirming commitment to NATO, a degree of over watch and protection could be installed, treating Ukraine as a buffer zone to protect western Europe from Russia.

Such a deal would skirt around the Hungarian and Slovak block to membership, while also making sure a postwar Ukraine was safe enough for investors to pump in money, and for civilians who fled to feel secure enough to return home to Ukraine.  Both these things are vital if Ukraine is going to have any chance to rebuild.

The negative to this idea is a permanent fixture of tens of thousands of active troops stationed at this border, and the associated costs.  Many countries may be hesitant to jump at a plan like this, even under a UN or NATO umbrella.

– There is a more 21st century solution.  One that would provide a tangible territorial barrier between Russia and Ukraine, without the need for these troops to be at the ready on the thousand-kilometer border … and we can look towards the Korean peninsula as example.

North and South Korea are separated by a heavily fortified and exceptionally dangerous demilitarized zone or DMZ where both sides maintain guard towers, manned fortification and nearby military bases.  Most of the defenses there are passive ones; a no-man’s-land full of landmines and physical barriers.  A zone devoid of civilians.

This approach is one that Ukraine and Russia could emulate either by designating a portion of territory as a demilitarized zone during a peace accord, or by Ukraine choosing to carve off a band of its own territory perhaps just a few or even a few dozen kilometers away from its eventual treaty lines, and fortifying that land in a way that Russia can’t directly interfere with.

A DMZ is an idea that Zelinsky’s own top advisor Mykhailo Podolyak endorsed back in May 2023 and, in late November of this year, retired American Naval Admiral and former NATO Supreme Allied Commander James Stavridis published an article on the same subject;

“Putin won’t return Crimea and the four provinces, and Zalinsky will hate this and protest it, but the military realities of Russian occupation are fixed.  Assuming that is the rough land calculus, the next step is to create a meaningful ceasefire by forging a demilitarized zone between territory held by each side, and have the opposing parties patrol it or perhaps even better there could be a neutral force of UN peacekeepers from Latin America or Africa.”

A UN force is probably pushing it. It’s not likely that the UN is wanting to park itself on Russia’s border for another 50 years, but it may agree to a rotating contingent.

Does any of this suggest that Russia is done with active war mongering?  And is Ukraine ready to submit to lost countryside?  No, but even though most analysts estimate that almost 1,500 undertrained Russian troops are killed every day, and that 20 Russian artillery placements are destroyed every day and up to 100 Russian tanks are taken out of the fight every month … Russia seems to have a lot more untrained young Russians to throw at it, to try to get as much land as possible for when negotiations start.

And Ukraine? Ukraine is notably showing signs of being tired.

They are unable to refill lost battalions, and although promised, western military aid is perpetually slow to get to the front lines, and a Trump presidency suggests a change in how Ukraine may be able to continue in the fight at all.

They just can’t push forward anymore and Russia has the advantage, in the war of attrition.
This forces all parties involved to look at all possible options, like the ones listed here.

It will be interesting to watch how all this unfolds next year.

David Johnson is a Kamloops resident, community volunteer and self described maven of all things Canadian.